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FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
IN ALASKA AND THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 
CHRISTOPHER R. MURRAY* 
Alaska and forty-seven other states have provisions that limit the 
voting rights of felons.  In many of these states, including Alaska, 
minority groups are disproprtionately affected by these felon 
disenfranchisement laws.  This Note examines the validity of these 
laws generally, and Alaska’s laws in particular, under the the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Alaska limits the voting rights of felons.1  Forty-seven other 
states have similar policies.2  And, as in many of these other states, 
racial minorities in Alaska are disproportionately affected.3  
Indeed, the state’s largest minority group, Alaska Natives, is 
overrepresented in the state’s prison population, indicating a 
greater likelihood of disenfranchisement.4  Because the right to 
vote is central to democratic government, any law that tends more 
frequently to disenfranchise racial minorities should be cause for 
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 1. ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2 (“No person may vote who has been convicted 
of a felony involving moral turpitude unless his civil rights have been restored.”). 
 2. JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF 
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES pt. IV (1998), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote. 
 3. Id. pt. III. 
 4. Alaska Natives constituted approximately sixteen percent of Alaska’s 
general population as of 2000, United States Census, available at 
http://factfinder.census.gov (under “get a Fact Sheet for your community” enter 
“Alaska” into “state” field; then follow “2000” link) [hereinafter U.S. Census], but 
represent over thirty-seven percent of the state’s prison population, ALASKA 
DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, 2003 OFFENDER PROFILE 11 (2004), available at 
http://www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/admin/docs/profile2003.pdf [hereinafter 
ALASKA OFFENDER PROFILE]. 
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alarm.  Nevertheless, because Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement 
laws appear not to have been enacted with a discriminatory 
purpose, they likely do not violate the Federal Constitution.5 
The laws may, however, run afoul of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 (“VRA”), which was amended in 1982 to invalidate state 
voting qualifications that have a racially disproportionate impact.6  
Recent litigation has challenged state felon disenfranchisement 
laws on this basis.7  Though none of these challenges have 
succeeded—and two circuits have held that the VRA simply does 
not apply to felon disenfranchisement8—the Ninth Circuit recently 
allowed a VRA challenge to the State of Washington’s felon 
disenfranchisement provision.9 
To date, no case has been brought challenging felon 
disenfranchisement in Alaska.  This Note is directed to that 
possibility.  Part II puts Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement laws 
into national context and explains why, even if they produce a 
racially discriminatory impact, they are likely not unconstitutional.  
Next, Part III assesses the circuit split over whether the VRA 
applies to felon disenfranchisement laws and the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision that it does.  Lastly, Part IV outlines the Ninth Circuit law 
that would govern a VRA challenge to Alaska’s felon 
disenfranchisement laws in light of a recent similar challenge in 
Washington. 
II.  ALASKA’S FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 
A. National Context 
Disenfranchisement of criminals is neither a unique nor a 
recent phenomenon. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia 
all, to some degree, have voting qualifications based on criminal 
status.10  The ancient Greeks and Romans disenfranchised those 
guilty of infamous crimes, and voting was among a range of civil 
 
 5. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 6. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43–44 (1986). 
 7. See, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006); Johnson v. 
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 8. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 310; Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234. 
 9. Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan I), 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 10. Debra Parkes, Ballot Boxes Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisoner 
Disenfranchisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 71, 73 (2003).  
Restrictions abroad, however, tend to be more mild than those found in the 
United States.  Id. 
04__MURRAY.DOC 1/10/2007  8:48 AM 
2006] FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 291 
rights denied in post-Renaissance Europe on the theory that 
criminals suffer a “civil death.”11 
Today in the United States, disenfranchisement is among 
many collateral consequences of felony conviction such as 
exclusion from certain professions and restrictions on carrying a 
concealed weapon.12  In a frequently quoted opinion, Judge Henry 
Friendly justified the practice on a Lockean social-contract theory 
by arguing that criminals, in breaking societal rules, waive their 
rights to participate in the rule-making.13  Other courts have 
expressed an interest in preserving the “purity of the ballot box” 
from infection by those who by their acts have proven themselves 
morally unfit.14 
Nevertheless, the practice is not without critics.15  With respect 
to traditional justifications for criminal sanction—rehabilitation, 
retribution, and deterrence—felon disenfranchisement seems to 
fall short given the counter-productivity of keeping criminals from 
participating in civil society, the disproportionate application of, in 
some cases, lifetime disenfranchisement to a broad range of crimes, 
and the limited deterrent effect of the threat of 
disenfranchisement.16  Abroad, felon disenfranchisement laws have 
been judicially rejected on political and human-rights grounds.17 
 
 11. Id. at 73–74; Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of 
Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 
1059–60 (2002). 
 12. See Scott M. Bennett, Note, Giving Ex-Felons the Right to Vote, 6 CAL. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2004) (outlining the most common normative arguments for and 
against felon disenfranchisement). 
 13. Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451–52 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, 
J.) (“A contention that the equal protection clause requires New York to allow 
convicted mafiosi to vote for district attorneys or judges would not only be 
without merit but as obviously so as anything can be.”). 
 14. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 345 (1972) (quoting TENN. CONST. art. 
IV, § 1). 
 15. See, e.g., Alec. C. Ewald, An “Agenda for Demolition”: The Fallacy and 
the Danger of the “Subversive Voting” Argument for Felony Disenfranchisement, 
36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 109 (2004). 
 16. See Bennett, supra note 12, ¶¶ 29–45. 
 17. The Canadian Supreme Court recently struck down a law preventing 
prisoners from voting.  Suavé v. Canada, [2002] S.C.R. 519.  The European Court 
of Human Rights held that a United Kingdom felon disenfranchisement law 
violated the human rights of convicts.  Hirst v. United Kingdom (No 2), 38 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 40 (2005).  For a detailed analysis of the Canadian decision, see Parkes, 
supra note 10, at 79–85.  For an analysis of the ECHR decision as well as an 
assessment of a “growing international consensus,” see Robin L. Nunn, Comment, 
Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Vote, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 763, 778–79 (2005). 
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The modern practice of felon disenfranchisement in the 
United States is primarily a function of state law.18  Forty-eight 
states and the District of Columbia have some form of felon 
disenfranchisement, generally consisting of constitutional 
provisions buttressed by statute.19  Felon disenfranchisement 
expanded after the nation’s founding, with most such laws enacted 
during the mid- to late-nineteenth century.20  At the time the 
Reconstruction Amendments were enacted, twenty-nine of the 
thirty-six states had some form of felon disenfranchisement.21 
Modern practice varies by state.  At the extreme, at least three 
states impose lifetime voting bans on felons.22  These jurisdictions 
go beyond the historical scope of felon disenfranchisement laws in 
the United States and the contemporary practice in other states 
and internationally.23  The reach of these laws is striking—lifetime 
disenfranchisement may even be predicated upon crimes such as 
jaywalking, vagrancy, or breaking a water pipe.24 
Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement law is not as severe.  The 
state constitution provides that “[n]o person may vote who has 
 
 18. Although the United States Constitution generally grants states the 
authority to establish voter qualifications, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, that 
authority is constrained, not only by other express constitutional provisions, e.g., 
U.S. CONST. amend. XV (right to vote cannot be denied on account of race); U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIX (gender); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (poll taxes), but also by 
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause as interfering with the 
fundamental right of voting, see Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 
(1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 19. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 2, pt. II (surveying severity of felon 
disenfranchisement laws by state).  For a state-by-state summary of state felon 
disenfranchisement laws, see SUSAN M. KUZMA, U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
THE PARDON ATTORNEY (DOJ/OPA), CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: 
A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (1996), http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/forms/state_ 
survey.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2006). 
 20. Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggens & Jeff Manza, Ballot Manipulation 
and the “Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon 
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850-2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 563–67 
(2003). 
 21. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 22. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 2, pt. II.  Restoration of civil rights, 
including the franchise, is possible in some states upon pardon of the offense.  See 
id. 
 23. For example, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia generally 
restore voting rights upon the completion of sentence.  See Parkes, supra note 10, 
at 73. 
 24. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 75–76 n.24 (1964) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
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been convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude unless his civil 
rights have been restored.”25  The provision was adopted at 
Alaska’s constitutional convention in 1956 and became law upon 
Alaska’s admission to the union in 1959.26  Congress approved 
Alaska’s constitution, including the felon disenfranchisement 
provision, when it granted statehood.27  The language mirrored that 
of contemporary provisions in other states’ constitutions.28 
The contours of the constitutional provision are set by statute.  
The term “felony involving moral turpitude” is defined to include 
nearly all felonies.29  Voting registration is automatically cancelled 
upon conviction.30  Voting rights are restored, and felons may re-
register to vote upon completion of their sentences including any 
terms of parole or probation.31  Felon disenfranchisement in 
Alaska, which is more lenient than the lifetime ban imposed in 
 
 25. ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2. 
 26. GORDON HARRISON, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE, 3 (4th 
ed. 2003), available at http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/infodocs/constitution/citizens_ 
guide.pdf [hereinafter CITIZEN’S GUIDE]. 
 27. See id. at 3–4. 
 28. GERALD A. MCBEATH, THE ALASKA STATE CONSTITUTION: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE 125 (1997).  The voting qualifications in Alaska’s original 
constitution included a literacy test.  CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 26, at 105. 
 29. ALASKA STAT. § 15.60.010(8) (2006).  At present, crimes meriting 
disenfranchisement (“felon[ies] involving moral turpitude”) include: 
those crimes that are immoral or wrong in themselves such as murder, 
manslaughter, assault, sexual assault, sexual abuse of a minor, unlawful 
exploitation of a minor, robbery, extortion, coercion, kidnapping, incest, 
arson, burglary, theft, forgery, criminal possession of a forgery device, 
offering a false instrument for recording, scheme to defraud, falsifying 
business records, commercial bribe receiving, commercial bribery, 
bribery, receiving a bribe, perjury, perjury by inconsistent statements, 
endangering the welfare of a minor, escape, promoting contraband, 
interference with official proceedings, receiving a bribe by a witness or a 
juror, jury tampering, misconduct by a juror, tampering with physical 
evidence, hindering prosecution, terroristic threatening, riot, criminal 
possession of explosives, unlawful furnishing of explosives, promoting 
prostitution, criminal mischief, misconduct involving a controlled 
substance or an imitation controlled substance, permitting an escape, 
promoting gambling, possession of gambling records, distribution of 
child pornography, and possession of child pornography . . . . 
Id. 
 30. ALASKA STAT. § 15.07.135. 
 31. ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.030 (“Upon the unconditional discharge, the person 
may register under AS 15.07.”).  “Unconditional discharge” occurs when “a 
person is released from all disability arising under a conviction and sentence, 
including probation and parole.”  ALASKA STAT. § 15.60.010(38). 
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some states, is in line with the policies of a majority of other 
states.32 
B. Felon Disenfranchisement and Race 
Though facially race-neutral, felon disenfranchisement laws 
were, historically, enacted with a discriminatory purpose.  Authors 
have noted that many states enacted such laws in the aftermath of 
the Civil War as part of a larger defensive response to the 
Reconstruction Amendments’ extension of the franchise to 
African-Americans.33  This response included poll taxes, literacy 
tests, and other Jim Crow measures to suppress the voting power of 
African-Americans.34  For example, a 1901 felon 
disenfranchisement provision to Alabama’s state constitution was 
expressly intended to single out only those felonies believed to be 
more frequently committed by African-Americans.35  In 1985, the 
Supreme Court struck down that provision in the case of Hunter v. 
Underwood.36 
To the extent felon disenfranchisement laws were tailored to 
maximize a racially disparate impact, they have enjoyed 
considerable success.37  Nationally, an estimated thirteen percent of 
African-American men are disenfranchised, with as many as thirty-
one percent of African-American men in two states—Alabama and 
Florida—permanently disenfranchised.38  Following a review of 
voting in the United States, the National Commission on Federal 
Election Reform, chaired by former presidents Jimmy Carter and 
Gerald Ford, urged states to scale back felon disenfranchisement 
laws, citing that as many as one in six African-Americans were 
disenfranchised in many states.39  Even where discriminatory intent 
 
 32. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 2, pt. III. 
 33. Behrens et al., supra note 20, at 563 (analyzing post-Civil War responses to 
extending the franchise to African-Americans and drawing on social science 
theories of race competition and criminal justice). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1985).  The Alabama statute 
at issue was not discriminatory on its face, but the Court nevertheless struck it 
down on the basis of discriminatory intent evidenced in the legislative history.  See 
id. at 227–32; Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 618–20 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 36. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. at 232–33. 
 37. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 2, pt. II (setting out the racially 
disproportionate impact of felon disenfranchisement laws). 
 38. Id. pt III. 
 39. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE 
PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 51 (August 2001), available 
at http://millercenter.virginia.edu/programs/natl_commissions/final_report.html. 
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has not been proven, discriminatory effect continues to be the 
reality.40 
Alaska’s experience is comparable.  Although comprehensive 
studies of racial disparity in felon disenfranchisement in Alaska are 
unavailable, incarceration statistics provide a useful proxy.41  
Alaska’s largest minority group, Alaska Natives, comprise 
approximately sixteen percent of the state’s general population,42 
but they account for thirty-seven percent of its prison population.43  
Similar disparity exists in the cases of other minorities, including 
African-Americans, who account for over ten percent of the prison 
population44 while representing less than four percent of the 
general population.45  It has been suggested that cultural factors 
may make Alaska Natives more susceptible to felon 
disenfranchisement.46  The precise mechanism by which racial bias 
in the criminal justice system may result in disproportionate 
disenfranchisement, and indeed whether racial bias is the cause of 
the disparity, is unclear and would require further study. 
C. Constitutionality of Alaska’s Felon Disenfranchisement Law 
Felon disenfranchisement laws come under constitutional 
scrutiny in two ways.  First, as a restriction on voting, the laws 
interfere with a fundamental right and implicate the Equal 
 
 40. In Florida, the Eleventh Circuit denied an equal protection challenge to 
the state’s felon disenfranchisement laws for lack of demonstrated racially 
discriminatory intent, Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 
2005), even though nearly one in three African-American men in Florida is 
permanently disenfranchised, see FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 2, pt. III. 
 41. Incarceration rates are, at best, an imprecise proxy for felon 
disenfranchisement.  They are over-inclusive in that they include those inmates 
who are ineligible to vote, as well as those incarcerated for misdemeanors, and 
they are under-inclusive in that they do not include parolees or Alaska felons 
incarcerated outside of the state who are also unable to vote. 
 42. U.S. Census, supra note 4. 
 43. ALASKA OFFENDER PROFILE, supra note 4. 
 44. Id. 
 45. U.S. Census, supra note 4. 
 46. See, e.g., Dave Stephenson, For Alaska Natives: Extermination by 
Incarceration?, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, June 26, 2003, available at 
http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1056628610 (advancing the 
argument that Alaska Natives may be more likely to confess to a crime upon 
arrest than are white arrestees, thereby reducing the likelihood of a plea 
agreement for a lesser charge or sentence).  If true, such factors might make 
felony—as opposed to misdemeanor—conviction more likely, leading to longer 
incarceration periods and thereby exacerbating the impact of felon 
disenfranchisement. 
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Second, 
because the laws affect the voting rights of racial minorities, they 
also implicate the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on 
disenfranchisement “on account of race.”47  Supreme Court 
decisions addressing both theories have concluded that felon 
disenfranchisement laws are constitutional unless it can be proved 
they were enacted with racially discriminatory intent.48 
Ordinarily, a state law affecting a fundamental right, such as 
voting, would be subject to strict scrutiny. 49  However, in the 1974 
case of Richardson v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court held that felon 
disenfranchisement laws are not subject to heightened scrutiny 
under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment because Section 2 
of that Amendment includes an “affirmative sanction” of such 
laws.50  Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reduces a 
state’s representation in Congress in proportion to its 
disenfranchisement of otherwise qualified voters, provides an 
exception for disenfranchisement based on “participation in 
rebellion, or other crime.”51  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 
divided court, reasoned that “those who framed and adopted the 
Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended to prohibit 
outright in § 1 of that Amendment that which was expressly 
exempted from the lesser sanction of reduced representation 
imposed by § 2 of the Amendment.”52 Put another way, the voting 
 
 47. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 48. The Court has also heard and rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to 
felon disenfranchisement.  See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1958) (felon 
disenfranchisement is not punitive and merely designates a grounds for voting 
eligibility).  For an in-depth treatment of felon disenfranchisement as punishment 
in the context of the Eighth Amendment, see Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of 
Cain: Disenfranchised Felons and the Constitutional No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 85 (2005). 
 49. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1969) 
(applying strict scrutiny to voting restrictions); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
561–62 (1964) (“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter. . . .”); 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[T]he political franchise . . . is 
regarded as a fundamental political right . . . .”). 
 50. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974). 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  The Amendment provides in pertinent part 
that “when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied . . . or in any way 
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation [in Congress] shall be reduced . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 43. 
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rights of felons are not protected as “fundamental” under the 
Equal Protection Clause.53 
Nevertheless, even if Richardson shields felon 
disenfranchisement laws from strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause,54 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment still 
operates independently to prevent purposeful racial discrimination.  
In Hunter v. Underwood,55 the Supreme Court struck down a 
provision in Alabama’s constitution disenfranchising those 
convicted of certain enumerated felonies.56  The provision was 
enacted in 1901 with the purpose of disenfranchising on the basis of 
race and applied only to felonies believed committed more 
frequently by African-Americans.57  Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the Court as he did in Richardson, explained that 
“[w]ithout again considering the implicit authorization of [felon 
disenfranchisement under § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment], we 
are confident that § 2 was not designed to permit the purposeful 
 
 53. At least one circuit has framed the law in this way.  See Owens v. Barnes, 
711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 54. Richardson’s reading of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
widely criticized.  See, e.g., Carlos M. Portugal, Democracy Frozen in Devonian 
Amber: The Racial Impact of Permanent Felon Disenfranchisement in Florida, 57 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1317, 1325–26 (2003); John Hart Ely, Interclausal Immunity, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1185, 1195 (2001).  Dissenting, Justice Marshall argued in Richardson 
that Section 2 merely established a system of punitive reduction in representation 
for disenfranchisement as a compromise because wholesale enfranchisement of 
African-Americans would have been unpalatable and, therefore, that the scope of 
the language of Section 2 is limited to the operation of its punitive sanction and 
not to the entirety of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Richardson, 418 U.S. at 73–74 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
For an argument that the Fifteenth Amendment effectively repealed Section 
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, that the latter cannot shield felon 
disenfranchisement laws from equal protection scrutiny, see Gabriel J. Chin, 
Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth 
Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259 
(2004). 
Richardson preempts the question of whether, without a Section 2 shield, 
felon disenfranchisement would survive strict scrutiny.  For an argument that 
felon disenfranchisement fails strict scrutiny because it is over-inclusive and only 
tenuously related to the most commonly cited state interests, see Angela Behrens, 
Note, Voting—Not Quite a Fundamental Right?  A Look at Legal and Legislative 
Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 98 MINN. L. REV. 231, 259–72 
(2004). 
 55. 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985). 
 56. Id. at 232. 
 57. Id. at 227–28; see discussion supra note 35. 
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racial discrimination attending the enactment and operation of [a 
law] which otherwise violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”58 
Independently of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth 
Amendment prohibits the denial of the right to vote “on account of 
race.”59  The Supreme Court has construed this prohibition to apply 
only to intentional discrimination.60  In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 
the Supreme Court held that “action by a State that is racially 
neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”61 
Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement laws are facially neutral and 
would, therefore, be unconstitutional only if enacted with a 
discriminatory purpose.  Because the laws do not appear to have 
been adopted with racially discriminatory intent,62 they are subject 
to legal challenge, if at all, only under federal legislation.63 
III.  THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 
A. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the 1982 Amendments 
Though the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, it took 
nearly one hundred years before Congress systematically addressed 
disenfranchisement of racial minorities.64  The Voting Rights Act of 
196565 was enacted by Congress to “banish the blight of racial 
discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in 
parts of our country for nearly a century.”66  Congress was 
prompted to act after case-by-case litigation under previous 
legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1957, failed to 
 
 58. Id. at 233. 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 60. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980). 
 61. Id. 
 62. This Note assumes, for the purpose of analysis, that discriminatory intent 
did not drive enactment of Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement laws—or, at the 
very least, that discriminatory purpose likely could not be proven in the context of 
a constitutional challenge. 
 63. Of course, less countermajoritarian methods of legal reform remain 
available to Alaskans, such as constitutional amendment and the state legislative 
process. 
 64. Portugal, supra note 54, at 1328. 
 65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971–1973 (2000), as amended in 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 
Stat. 314 (1970), and in 1982, Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982).  The VRA has 
been reauthorized and amended by Congress on several occasions, including in 
1970, 1975, and 1982, and was reauthorized by the President in July 2006.  Bush 
Signs Extension of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at A22. 
 66. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
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adequately prevent disenfranchisement on account of race.67  The 
VRA imposed bold measures, including section 5, which prohibited 
the use of discriminatory tests or devices, such as literacy tests, and 
required that any state making use of such devices would thereafter 
have to apply for pre-clearance from the U.S. Attorney General or 
a federal circuit judge in Washington, D.C. for any future changes 
to voting laws.68  At the time of the VRA’s enactment, Alaska 
employed a literacy test and was, therefore, designated a “covered 
jurisdiction” for these purposes.69  Federal supervision of the voting 
laws of “covered jurisdictions,” most of which are in the South, 
continues today.70 
In 1966, the Supreme Court upheld the VRA as a valid 
exercise of Congress’s enforcement powers under Section 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment.71  In 1980, however, the Court narrowed the 
effect of the VRA in City of Mobile v. Bolden.72  There, the Court 
held that section 2 of the VRA73 had “an effect no different from 
that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself” and that a voting 
qualification law would only be struck down under the Act if it 
were proved that the law was enacted with a racially discriminatory 
purpose.74  In so doing, the Court overruled the then-applicable 
“effects test” for voting qualifications.75 
In 1982, Congress responded to City of Mobile by adding a 
“totality of the circumstances” test to section 2 of the VRA.76  
 
 67. Id. at 313. 
 68. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 89 Pub. L. 110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
 69. See Laughlin McDonald, The Voting Rights Act in Indian Country: South 
Dakota, A Case Study, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2004); CITIZEN’S GUIDE, 
supra note 26, at 107. 
 70. Congressional representatives from southern states covered by the VRA’s 
section 5 pre-clearance provisions sought to remove those provisions during the 
reauthorization of the VRA in 2006.  See Raymond Hernandez, After Challenges, 
House Approves Renewal of Voting Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at A13. 
 71. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337. 
 72. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
 73. The original text of the section read, “No voting qualification or 
prerequisites to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or 
applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”  Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, 89 Pub. L. 11, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
 74. City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 61–62. 
 75. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973) (totality of the 
circumstances test applied to vote dilution case brought under section 2 of the 
VRA). 
 76. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986).  The amended section 2 
provides, in pertinent part: 
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Under the amended VRA, “plaintiffs [can] prevail by showing that, 
under the totality of the circumstances, a challenged election law or 
procedure [has] the effect of denying a protected minority an equal 
chance to participate in the electoral process.”77  As the Court later 
explained, “[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral 
law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical 
conditions” to cause unequal voting power.78 
B. Applicability of the VRA to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws 
Since the 1982 amendments to the VRA, several plaintiffs 
have sought to use it to invalidate felon disenfranchisement laws on 
the basis of their racially disproportionate effects.79  Circuits have 
split over whether the VRA does, in fact, apply to felon 
disenfranchisement laws.  The Second Circuit in Hayden v. Pataki 
and the Tenth Circuit in Johnson v. Governor of Florida both held 
the VRA inapplicable to felon disenfranchisement laws.80  In 
contrast, in Farrakhan v. Washington,81 the Ninth Circuit held that 
“[f]elon disenfranchisement is a voting qualification, and Section 2 
is clear that any voting qualification that denies citizens the right to 
vote in a discriminatory manner violates the VRA.”82  Therefore, a 
claim against Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement laws would be 
 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, 
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color . . . . 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on 
the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that . . . members of 
[protected racial minorities] have less opportunity than other members 
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 77. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44 n.8. 
 78. Id. at 47. 
 79. Id.; see, e.g.,  Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006); Johnson v. 
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 80. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 310; see Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234. 
 81. Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan I), 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 82. Id.  The Sixth Circuit also considered a VRA challenge to Tennessee’s 
felon disenfranchisement law in Wesley v. Collins,  791 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1986).  
The court did not directly consider whether the VRA applies to felon 
disenfranchisement but appears to have assumed that it did.  See id. at 1262 
(affirming dismissal of the VRA claim on summary judgment). 
04__MURRAY.DOC 1/10/2007  8:48 AM 
2006] FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 301 
“cognizable under Section 2 of the VRA” under Ninth Circuit 
precedent.83 
The Second and Tenth Circuit opinions concluding that the 
VRA does not apply to felon disenfranchisement laws rely on three 
arguments: (1) that the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes felon 
disenfranchisement laws (the “affirmative sanction” argument); (2) 
that application of the VRA to felon disenfranchisement would be 
an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s enforcement power; and 
(3) that canons of statutory construction support construing the 
VRA not to apply to felon disenfranchisement laws.  The relative 
merits of each argument are assessed in turn. 
1. The “Affirmative Sanction” Argument.  As discussed 
previously, the Richardson case established that felon 
disenfranchisement laws enacted without racially discriminatory 
intent do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.84  This is because 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enforcement 
mechanism—that a state’s representation in Congress will be 
reduced in proportion to the disenfranchisement of otherwise 
qualified voters—carries an express exception for 
disenfranchisement based on “participation in rebellion, or other 
crime.”85 
The Eleventh Circuit, in Johnson, seized on language in 
Richardson describing Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
an “affirmative sanction” of felon disenfranchisement and cited it 
for the proposition that states have discretion to deny the vote to 
convicted felons.86  The court argued that applying the VRA to 
Florida’s felon disenfranchisement law would allow “a 
congressional statute to override the text of the Constitution.”87  
More recently, the Second Circuit, in Hayden, cited Section 2 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as the “starting point” in the analysis 
of the VRA’s applicability to New York’s felon disenfranchisement 
law.88  The Second Circuit, while noting that felon 
 
 83. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1016. 
 84. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54–55 (1974); supra notes 50–58 
and accompanying text. 
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 86. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1228–29 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54). 
 87. Id. at 1229. 
 88. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 316 (2d Cir. 2006); accord Muntaqim v. 
Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 122 (2d Cir. 2004). Hayden is the en banc rehearing of the 
Muntaqim decision, which is incorporated by reference. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 313–
14. 
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disenfranchisement provisions are not entirely immune from 
constitutional or congressional scrutiny, found that the Fourteenth 
Amendment provided “explicit approval” of those types of laws.89  
Dissenting from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of an en banc rehearing 
of the Farrakhan case, Judge Alex Kozinski argued that felon 
disenfranchisement laws were presumptively valid due to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s textual endorsement of such laws.90 
Interestingly, neither the Second Circuit nor Judge Kozinski 
addressed the fact that the VRA was enacted to enforce the 
Fifteenth Amendment, not the Fourteenth.  The Eleventh Circuit 
brushed off the distinction in a footnote.91  The distinction is, 
however, the key weakness to the “affirmative sanction” argument 
because the Fifteenth Amendment grants its own protections that 
are not hindered by purported limitations to the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Judge Barrington Daniels Parker, Jr. of the Second Circuit 
made this point in his dissent in Hayden.  Pointing out that 
Richardson’s “affirmative sanction” came in the context of a claim 
that felon disenfranchisement was a per se violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Judge Parker noted that “Richardson did 
not grant felon disenfranchisement immunity against any other 
ground of invalidity. . . .”92  As a textual matter, Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment at most “declines to prohibit” felon 
disenfranchisement and does not affirmatively immunize the 
practice relative to other constitutional protections.93  As Judge 
Parker reasoned: 
The Constitution does not endorse felon disenfranchisement 
when it declines to prohibit the practice, any more than the 
Constitution endorses felon enslavement when the Thirteenth 
Amendment states: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States . . . .”  
Declining to prohibit something is not the same as protecting it.94 
Nor does Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment require 
states to disenfranchise felons.  If states can choose not to 
disenfranchise felons without running afoul of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, then Congress, acting pursuant to its power to 
 
 89. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 316. 
 90. Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan II), 359 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 91. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1228–29 n.29. 
 92. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 349 (Parker, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. (citation omitted). 
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enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, can compel the same result.  
Indeed, the “affirmative sanction” argument is more of a rhetorical 
device than an independent constitutional limitation on the VRA. 
2. Arguments on the Constitutionality of the VRA as 
Enforcement Legislation.  Enforcement legislation under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments is valid only to the extent 
that it remedies or prevents actual constitutional violations.95  The 
Eleventh Circuit, Chief Judge John M. Walker, Jr.’s concurrence to 
the Second Circuit’s Hayden opinion, and Judge Kozinski’s dissent 
in the Ninth Circuit have all argued that the VRA would be 
unconstitutional as applied to felon disenfranchisement laws.96 
The enforcement power is limited by two independent 
requirements.  The first is that enforcement legislation must be 
supported by a history of constitutional violations.97  The second is 
that the measures must be narrowly tailored to the constitutional ill 
sought to be avoided.98  In his Hayden concurrence, Chief Judge 
Walker found no congressional record establishing that felon 
disenfranchisement laws have been used to discriminate against 
minority voters.99  In Johnson, the petitioners had argued that 
specific examples of violations should not be required because 
Congress could not envision every possible means of racial 
discrimination.100  The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, 
citing the widespread use of felon disenfranchisement laws at the 
time that the VRA was enacted.101  Lastly, Judge Kozinski 
emphasized in his dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of a 
rehearing in Farrakhan that “[t]he theoretical, undocumented 
threat of unconstitutional felon disenfranchisement laws simply 
doesn’t justify” application of section 2 to those state laws.102 
 
 95. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
 96. See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 330 (Walker, C.J., concurring); Johnson, 405 F.3d 
at 1231–32; Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan II), 359 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 97. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Kimel 
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 
130 (1970) (holding the amendment to VRA lowering the voting age to eighteen 
invalid because Congress made no findings that an age limit of twenty-one was 
used to discriminate on race). 
 98. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
 99. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 330–31 (Walker, C.J., concurring). 
 100. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1231 n.33. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan II), 359 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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Lack of congressional findings of a pattern of historical 
discrimination through felon disenfranchisement laws103 informs the 
analysis of the proportionality and congruence of the purported 
remedial measure at issue.  Although the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized the importance that enforcement legislation 
be geographically targeted,104 the VRA applies to all states 
regardless of their individual histories.105  To the extent the VRA is 
either inadequately supported by findings of a pattern of 
discrimination or not narrowly tailored, application of the VRA to 
felon disenfranchisement would be unconstitutional. 
The Ninth Circuit did not consider this issue in Farrakhan 
when it allowed a VRA challenge to Washington’s felon 
disenfranchisement law to proceed.106  On remand, the Farrakhan 
case was dismissed on summary judgment, mooting for now the 
question of constitutionality of the VRA as applied to felon 
disenfranchisement laws.107  Indeed, the narrow issue of as-applied 
constitutionality of the VRA as enforcement legislation relative to 
felon disenfranchisement laws would not be ripe until such a law is 
actually invalidated.  Rather, the constitutional doubt associated 
with application of the VRA to felon disenfranchisement serves 
primarily as a predicate for the statutory construction arguments 
discussed next. 
3. Statutory Interpretation Arguments.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the VRA was the same as that pointedly 
expressed in a dissent by Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the Second 
Circuit: “[i]t is plain to anyone reading the Voting Rights Act that 
it applies to all ‘voting qualification[s].’”108  The majority in the 
 
 103. This is not to say that there is not an actual record of state use of felon 
disenfranchisement laws to discriminate on race.  That states used felon 
disenfranchisement laws in order to discriminate is well documented.  See supra 
notes 33-37 and accompanying text.  Rather, that history is not part of the 
congressional findings made at the time of the enactment of the VRA and its 
relevant amendments.  See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 330–31 (Walker, C.J., concurring). 
 104. Farrakhan II, 359 F.3d at 1124 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that a 
purported enforcement legislation was not geographically targeted and was 
therefore struck down in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)). 
 105. Geographic targetedness is particularly relevant to the present analysis of 
Alaska and is addressed in Part IV. 
 106. See Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan I), 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 107. See Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan III), No. CV-96-076-RHW, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45987, at *2 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006). 
 108. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 367–68 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (second alteration 
in original); Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1016. 
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Second Circuit, though admitting that “[t]here is no question that 
the language of [section 2] is extremely broad . . . and could be read 
to include felon disenfranchisement provisions,” nevertheless 
stressed the importance of interpretation in light of congressional 
intent, cryptically citing dated authority for the proposition that 
“[t]he circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may 
persuade a court that Congress did not intend the words of 
common meaning to have their literal effect.”109 
Two canons of construction have been deployed to interpret 
the VRA away from felon disenfranchisement provisions: the 
avoidance canon and the clear statement rule.  The Eleventh 
Circuit relied upon the avoidance canon, which counsels that, in 
the case of an ambiguous statute, “where an otherwise acceptable 
construction of a statue would raise serious constitutional 
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such 
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent 
of Congress.”110 
The Second Circuit—both sitting en banc in Hayden and 
through the three-judge panel that decided Muntaqim v. Coombe, 
the predecessor to Hayden—distanced itself from the Eleventh 
Circuit’s reliance on the avoidance canon.111  The reason expressed 
in Muntaqim is that the clarity of the text of section 2 of the VRA 
is impossible to reconcile with the avoidance canon’s ambiguity 
requirement.112  Indeed, a concurring judge on the Eleventh Circuit 
conceded that the majority “overstates the case for constitutional 
avoidance” because “[a]s a purely textual matter, a voting 
 
 109. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 315 (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 
(1981)). 
 110. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 
U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 
 111. See 366 F.3d 102, 128 n.22 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[Section 2], while vague, does 
not seem ambiguous.”), aff’d en banc, Hayden, 449 F.3d 305.  The Hayden court 
barely mentioned the avoidance canon and made only passing reference to the 
Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on it.  449 F.3d at 313, 328 n.24. 
 112. See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 128 n.22.  The Johnson court, ironically, turned 
to the Muntaqim decision for the proposition that section 2 is ambiguous, citing 
that court’s assessment that the meaning of section 2 is “exceedingly difficult to 
discern.”  Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1229 n.30 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 116).  In the quoted passage, however, the 
Muntaqim court referred to ambiguity in the degree of intent required to establish 
a violation of section 2, not the scope of the Act’s coverage relative to felon 
disenfranchisement laws.  Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229 n.30; Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 
116–18. 
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qualification based on felony status . . . falls within the scope of the 
VRA.”113 
A stronger statutory construction argument, and the one 
adopted by the majority in Hayden, is premised on the so-called 
clear statement rule.  The rule provides that “if Congress intends to 
alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the 
Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so 
‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”114  The Hayden 
court held that the clear statement rule does not require ambiguity 
but only a lack of a clear statement, explaining that “we will apply 
the clear statement rule when a statute admits of an interpretation 
that would alter the federal balance but there is reason to 
believe . . . that Congress may not have intended such an alteration 
of the federal balance.”115  The rule is intended to prevent a statute 
from inadvertently affecting the federal-state balance of power.  
The Supreme Court has held, in another context, that “clear 
statement rules ensure Congress does not, by broad or general 
language, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently or without due 
deliberation.”116  Given that sweeping language alone may not 
satisfy the clear statement rule, the question becomes one of 
congressional intent. 
Considerable evidence suggests that Congress did not intend 
the VRA to apply to felon disenfranchisement laws.117  For 
example, though Congress expressly identified common forms of 
discriminatory voter qualifications, including literacy, educational, 
and moral character tests, it never mentioned felon 
disenfranchisement in the text of the VRA.118  In fact, as noted by 
the Hayden court, the only reference to felon disenfranchisement 
in the legislative history of the VRA was to clarify that the VRA’s 
character test provisions “would not result in the proscription of 
the frequent requirement of States and political subdivisions that 
an applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of 
conviction of a felony or mental disability.”119  Indeed, the Hayden 
 
 113. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1239–40 (Wilson, J., concurring in part). 
 114. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (quoting Will v. Mich., 
491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (internal citation omitted)). 
 115. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 325. 
 116. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005) 
(addressing a presumption against applying statutes to the internal affairs of 
foreign vessels). 
 117. See, e.g., Hayden, 449 F.3d at 315. 
 118. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (2000). 
 119. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 318 (quoting S. Rep. No. 89-162, at 24 (1965), 
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2562); see also H.R. Rep. No. 89-439, at 19 
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court reasoned that, given the prevalence of felon 
disenfranchisement statutes, “it seems unfathomable that Congress 
would silently amend the Voting Rights Act in a way that would 
affect them.”120 
Whether application of the VRA to felon disenfranchisement 
laws would upset the federal-state balance is in dispute.  In 
Muntaqim, the Second Circuit held that the federal-state balance 
would be upset because applying the VRA to felon 
disenfranchisement laws would exceed Congress’s enforcement 
power and contradict Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.121  
The Eleventh Circuit in Johnson concurred generally with that 
conclusion but did not rely on it.122  On a rehearing of Muntaqim in 
Hayden, the Second Circuit hewed its analysis more directly to 
“three important state interests” that would be affected by 
applying the VRA to New York’s felon disenfranchisement law: 
“(1) the regulation of the franchise; (2) the State’s authority to 
craft its criminal law; and (3) the regulation of correctional 
institutions.”123 
Rejecting the federalism concerns similarly raised by the 
Tenth Circuit in Johnson, Judge Rosemary Barkett in dissent 
reasoned that federalism is not implicated by the VRA because the 
“Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments altered the constitutional 
balance between the two sovereigns—not the Voting Rights Act, 
which merely enforces the guarantees of those amendments.”124  
This argument was repeated in Judge Parker’s Hayden dissent.125 
 
(1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2457.  Nor did the 1982 amendments 
expand the scope of the VRA.  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383–84 (1991) 
(“[T]he coverage provided by the 1982 amendment is coextensive with the 
coverage provided by the Act prior to 1982.”).  The 1982 amendments merely 
lowered the evidentiary burden to establish a violation by replacing an “intent” 
test with an “effects” test.  Id. at 403–04. 
 120. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 317 (quoting Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 
1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 121. See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 126 (2d Cir. 2004).  Both 
arguments against applying the VRA to felon disenfranchisement discussed serve 
as predicates for application of the clear statement rule because they implicate 
federalism. 
 122. The court makes passing reference to the clear statement rule in a 
footnote.  See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1232 n.35. 
 123. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 326. 
 124. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1250 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing a dissent from an 
equally divided court in the Second Circuit’s first consideration of the question in 
Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 938 (2d Cir. 1996) (Feinberg, J., dissenting)). 
 125. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 358. 
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Whatever the uncertainties of the basis for these divergent 
circuit decisions, Ninth Circuit law is, for now, clear that a 
challenge to Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement law is possible 
under section 2 of the VRA. 
IV.  ALASKA’S FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAW AND THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 
A. Ninth Circuit’s Framework for Challenges Under Section 2 of 
the VRA 
Nearly a decade before Farrakhan, the Ninth Circuit set a 
framework for challenges under section 2 of the VRA in Smith v. 
Salt River.126  Salt River involved an Arizona agricultural district 
power board election rule that limited voting to landowners within 
the district.127  African-American plaintiffs claimed that the voting 
qualification combined with racial disparities in land ownership 
rates had a racially disproportionate effect on voting rights in 
violation of section 2 of the VRA.128 
The Salt River court affirmed that section 2 of the VRA 
“prohibits voting qualifications which result in discrimination on 
account of race or color . . . [and] requires proof only of a 
discriminatory result, not of discriminatory intent.”129  Further, the 
intent is judged under the “totality of the circumstances” test with 
reference to several non-exclusive, so-called Senate Factors 
identified in the legislative history of the VRA.130 
 
 126. Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 
586 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 127. Id. at 589. 
 128. Id. at 588. 
 129. Id. at 594 (citing Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 394 (1991)). 
 130. Id. at 594 n.6.  The Senate Factors are: 
(1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or 
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the 
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the 
democratic process[;] 
(2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political 
subdivision is racially polarized; 
(3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used 
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single 
shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may 
enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 
(4) if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the 
minority group have been denied access to that process; 
(5) the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or 
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as 
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Significantly, in interpreting the “totality of the circumstances” 
test under the VRA, the Salt River court held that “a bare 
statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial minority 
does not satisfy the § 2 ‘results’ inquiry.  Instead, ‘section 2 
plaintiffs must show a causal connection between the challenged 
voting practice and [a] prohibited discriminatory result.’”131 
As the Ninth Circuit explained, “[t]he real question this case 
presents is whether the land ownership requirement denies 
African-Americans the right and opportunity to vote . . . .”132  
Affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of a “causal 
connection,” the Ninth Circuit, relying heavily on a stipulated lack 
of historical racial discrimination, concluded that “the statistical 
disparity in African-American and white home ownership does not 
prove the District has violated § 2.”133 
B. Applying the VRA in Farrakhan 
In late 2000, the Eastern District of Washington dismissed for 
the first time a claim by Muhammad Shabazz Farrakhan and others 
that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law violated section 2 
of the VRA.134  The court held that “although the 
disenfranchisement provision clearly has a disproportionate impact 
on racial minorities, there is no evidence that the provision’s 
enactment was motivated by racial animus, or that its operation by 
 
education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to 
participate effectively in the political process; 
(6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or 
subtle racial appeals; 
(7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected 
to public office in the jurisdiction; 
Additional factors . . . are: 
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of 
elected officials to the particularized need of the members of the 
minority group; [and] whether the policy underlying the state or political 
subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure is tenuous. 
Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 
206–07). 
 131. Id. at 595 (alteration in original) (quoting Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia 
Office of the City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 312 (9th Cir. 
1997)). 
 132. Id. at 596. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Farrakhan v. Locke, No. CS-96-76-RHW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22212, at 
*18 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2000), rev’d in part sub nom., Farrakhan v. Washington 
(Farrakhan I), 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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itself has a discriminatory effect.”135  The court referenced the 
Senate Factors but declined to apply them directly.136  Instead, the 
court reasoned that, factoring out racial discrimination in the 
criminal justice system, it was impossible to show a discriminatory 
effect from the disenfranchisement provision.137 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s reasoning and 
held that section 2 of the VRA required more than an isolated 
inquiry into the challenged voting qualification without reference 
to external factors.138  Instead, the court emphasized that section 2’s 
“totality of the circumstances” test “requires courts to consider 
how a challenged voting practice interacts with external factors such 
as ‘social and historical conditions’ to result in denial of the right to 
vote on account of race or color.”139  Holding that an inquiry into a 
“causal connection” between racial discrimination and denial of 
voting rights involves reference to the relevant Senate Factors, the 
court specifically noted that “racial bias in the criminal justice 
system” is relevant and encompassed in the factors.140 
Having rejected the “by itself” causation standard applied by 
the district court, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for an 
evaluation of the external factors that may establish a causal 
relationship between discrimination in the criminal justice system 
and the voting mechanism based on felony status.141  The court 
explained that “a causal connection may be shown where the 
discriminatory impact of a challenged voting practice is attributable 
to racial discrimination in the surrounding social and historical 
circumstances.”142  The court illustrated the test with reference to 
the Salt River case.143  There, the challenge failed because the 
external factor—a difference in land ownership rates—was not 
“substantially explained by race.”144 
Captioned Farrakhan v. Gregoire on remand, the case was 
heard a second time by Judge Robert Whaley of the Eastern 
 
 135. Locke, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22212, at *9–*10. 
 136. Id. at *9 n.4. 
 137. Id. at *10. 
 138. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1011–12. 
 139. Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)). 
 140. Id. at 1020. 
 141. Id. at 1019–20 (“[C]ourts must be able to consider whether voting 
practices ‘accommodate or amplify the effect that . . . discrimination has on the 
voting process.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Salt River Project 
Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 109 F.3d 595 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997))). 
 142. Id. at 1019. 
 143. Id. (citing Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595). 
 144. Id. at 1017 (quoting Salt River, 109 F.3d at 591). 
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District of Washington.145  Reviewing statistical evidence of racial 
discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system, Judge 
Whaley wrote that “the Court is compelled to find that there is 
discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system on account 
of race . . . [and] this discrimination ‘clearly hinder[s] the ability of 
racial minorities to participate effectively in the political 
process . . . .’”146 
In spite of this finding, the court in Farrakhan III took the 
“totality of the circumstances” test as an opportunity to balance 
away intentional discrimination in the criminal justice system with 
reference to historical and social factors indicating a lack of 
discriminatory intent in Washington.  Addressing the Senate 
Factors, the court cited a range of historical and social conditions 
such as: Washington’s support for racial minorities; a lack of 
discriminatory intent in the enactment of the felon 
disenfranchisement law; the long tradition of felon 
disenfranchisement in the United States; and even the implicit 
endorsement of felon disenfranchisement in Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.147  Weighing the factors, the court 
concluded that “the totality of the circumstances does not support 
a finding that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law results in 
discrimination in its electoral process on account of race.”148 
C. Alaska’s Felon Disenfranchisement Law in Light of 
Farrakhan III 
The court in Farrakhan III found that Washington’s felon 
disenfranchisement law did not violate section 2 of the VRA in 
spite of “compelling” evidence of racial discrimination in the 
criminal justice system.149  Despite the Ninth Circuit’s holding that a 
violation depends on the interaction between a voting mechanism 
and external factors, the court in Farrakhan III weighed 
“Washington’s history, or lack thereof, of racial bias in its electoral 
process” to find that the totality of the circumstances test does not 
support a finding that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law 
violates the VRA.150 
 
 145. Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan III), No. CV-96-076-RHW, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 45987 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006). 
 146. Id. at *18 (quoting Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1020) (evaluating evidence 
under the summary judgment standard). 
 147. Id. at *23–*28. 
 148. Id. at *29. 
 149. Id. at *28. 
 150. Id. at *28–*29. 
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Significantly, the court in Farrakhan III allowed historical 
evidence to stand in for an analysis of the required causal 
connection between discrimination and racially disproportionate 
effects of a voting qualification.  In Salt River, the disproportionate 
land ownership rates were not the result of discrimination—they 
were simply a statistical anomaly.151  In Farrakhan III, 
disproportionate felony conviction was more than a statistical 
anomaly—it was evidence of racial discrimination.152  Nevertheless, 
this causal nexus was deemed outweighed by other Senate Factors.  
Indeed, applying a balancing test to the Senate Factors may 
provide a back door for other arguments, such as the “affirmative 
sanction argument,” which the Ninth Circuit has rejected.153 
In Alaska, the statistics demonstrate that felon 
disenfranchisement has a racially disproportionate impact.154  
Compared with Washington, however, Alaska may not be able to 
rely so heavily on evidence of a historical lack of racial bias to 
defeat a challenge to its felon disenfranchisement law.  One factor 
sure to be considered by any court hearing a VRA challenge to 
Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement law will be that Alaska was 
designated a “covered jurisdiction” because of its use of a literacy 
test at the time of the VRA’s enactment.155  Although Alaska was 
able to demonstrate in 1966 that it had not made racially 
discriminatory use of that test for the preceding five years,156 the 
stigma of having been singled out under section 5 of the VRA 
weighs in favor, perhaps, of additional scrutiny under section 2.  
Nevertheless, the outcome of a challenge to Alaska’s felon 
disenfranchisement law is certain to be, as it was in Salt River and 
Farrakhan III, a fact-specific inquiry shaded by the trial court’s 
view of the proper application of the totality of the circumstances 
test. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Felon disenfranchisement in Alaska will continue to be cause 
for concern as long as it works a racially disproportionate effect.  
Though recent decisions in the Tenth and Second Circuits have 
 
 151. Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 
586, 596 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 152. Farrakhan III, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45987 at *28. 
 153. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986) (considering the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a factor in the totality of the circumstances test). 
 154. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 155. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 156. CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 26, at 107 (noting that literacy tests in Alaska 
“lingered under a cloud of suspicion”). 
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rejected claims against state felon disenfranchisement laws brought 
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Ninth Circuit 
has expressly held that such challenges can proceed.  One such 
claim, in the State of Washington, was ultimately unsuccessful.  
Nevertheless, a case brought in Alaska, on different facts and 
before a different court, may well invalidate the state’s practice of 
disenfranchising felons on the basis of its racially disproportionate 
impact. 
